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Abstract-- Identifying the multiple critical components in 
power systems whose absence together has severe impact on 
system performance is a crucial problem for power systems 
known as (N-x) contingency analysis. However, the inherent 
combinatorial feature of the N-x contingency analysis problem 
incurs by the increase of x in the (N-x) term, making the problem 
intractable for even relatively small test systems. We present a 
new framework for identifying the N-x contingencies that 
captures both topology and physics of the network. Graph theory 
provides many ways to measure power grid graphs, i.e. buses as 
nodes and lines as edges, allowing researchers to characterize 
system structure and optimize algorithms. This paper proposes a 
scalable approach based on the group betweenness centrality 
(GBC) concept that measures the impact of multiple components 
in the electric power grid as well as line outage distribution 
factors (LODFs) that find the lines whose loss has the highest 
impact on the power flow in the network. The proposed approach 
is a quick and efficient solution for identifying the most critical 
lines in power networks. The proposed approach is validated 
using various test cases, and results show that the proposed 
approach is able to quickly identify multiple contingencies that 
result in violations. 
 
Index Terms-- Contingency analysis, line outage distribution 
factors, graph theory, betweenness centrality. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HIS work is motivated by extreme events in electric 
power systems that are caused by multiple contingencies. 
Robust operation of the power grid requires anticipation of 
unplanned component outages that could trigger extreme 
events [1].Although electric power grids are designed to be 
resilient against any single contingency (N-1 contingency), 
loss of multiple components can lead to system instability, 
uncontrolled separation, cascading outages, voltage collapse, 
etc [1].Additionally, smart grid deployment exposes the 
electric power grid to purposeful and malicious attacks which 
raises concerns about the possibility of malicious N-x 
scenarios. Thus, it is important to make the system secure not 
only for any given N-1contingency but also for selected N-x 
contingencies. This results in a large number of contingencies 
that need to be analyzed [2]. Numerous efforts have been put 
on identifying the most critical components in electric power 
grids. Deter-mining and evaluating all possible combinations 
of component failures is a combinatorial problem which is not 
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tractable even for medium size power systems. This is easily 
demonstrated by direct calculation of the number of 
combinations required for N-3 and N-4 analysis for a 10000-
component system. The N-3 analysis involves approximately 
1012
6
 combinations and the N-4 analysis involves 
1016
24
 [3]. In 
this paper we propose a tractable generalize contingency 
selection approach based on the graph theory concept, i.e. 
group betweenness centrality (GBS), together with line outage 
distribution factors that identifies group of components whose 
loss would have severe impact on the power system. We 
hereafter refer to those components as critical components.  
Critical components can be identified through network 
structural analysis. Graph-based methodologies provide 
promising approaches capable of finding these critical 
components, e.g. lines, buses in power systems [4]. Graph 
topology can also be used to detect anomalies in electric 
power grid [5]. Previous work has proposed a variety of 
metrics to identify the most critical components in electric 
grid. Developed in the context of social network analysis, 
betweenness centrality is a concept that captures the relative 
importance of an entity in a network [6]. These include 
betweenness centrality that reflects the edge or node 
importance in network structure [7].  
Multiple studies utilize the betweenness centrality concept to 
identify the most critical component in power grid [4], [8]. 
The proposed approach in [4] applies the network centrality 
measures to fulfill the N-1 contingency analysis. Similarly, the 
approach in [8] uses different centrality measure including 
node and edge betweenness centrality to identify important 
nodes and edges in power systems. Electrical centrality metric 
which is calculated based on the impedance matrix Zbus and 
utilizes the centrality metric, to explain why in electric power 
grids a few numbers of highly connected bus failures can 
cause cascading effect, is investigated in different studies [9]– 
[11]. A graph edge betweenness centrality measure is 
proposed in [12] to perform contingency analysis of large-
scale power grid. The betweenness centrality concept is 
extended in [13] to account for N-x contingency selection for 
𝑥 ≥ 2. 
 Although the structural analysis of electric power grid returns 
invaluable information regarding the vulnerability analysis, 
pure structural analysis cannot capture the physical features of 
the electric power grid. Thus, it is essential to have a more 
comprehensive model for approximating failure behavior of 
electric power grid [14]. To address these issues, different 
properties of electric power grids along with the betweenness 
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centrality concept have been taken into consideration to 
address the physics of the networks. Maximal load demand 
and the capacity of generators are considered along with the 
betweenness centrality in [15] to analyze the vulnerability of 
electric power grid. Electrical distance, an essential feature of 
power network, is taken into account in the betweenness 
centrality metric to capture the grid properties [16]. The 
betweenness centrality is applied to the weighted graph of 
electric power grid, weighted by the corresponding admittance 
matrix, for vulnerability analysis of power network [17]. 
Although the proposed approaches in [15]-[17] consider the 
electrical properties of electric power grids, none of them 
captures the impacts that loss of a component might have on 
the system. In this paper, the line outage distribution 
factors(LODF) [18], a sensitivity metric of how a change in a 
line’s status affects the flows on other lines in the system, 
enables the proposed approach to capture the physics of the 
power network and thus improves the accuracy of the results. 
The LODF metric has already been used in identifying 
multiple contingencies in power systems [18], but the 
approach proposed in [18] is limited to N-2 contingency 
analysis. Additionally, in this paper the betweenness centrality 
factor is extended to the group betweenness centrality which 
facilitate searching for multiple components in the network. 
The proposed approach in this paper is generalized 
contingency analysis that without any limitation performs 
different multiple contingency analysis.  
The proposed method in this paper is demonstrated for the line 
outages, but without loss of generality it can also be used in 
similar way for node outages. The contribution of this paper is 
threefold. First, we present a novel scheme to apply N-x group 
betweenness centrality to contingency analysis. Second, we 
leverage LODF metrics to facilitate the proposed algorithm 
with augmenting line outage impact on power flow in the 
network. Third, we validate that the proposed method is 
computationally tractable for multiple (N-x) contingency 
analysis in very large power systems, i.e. with couple of 
thousands of lines.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the 
betweenness centrality measure and its extension, i.e. group 
betweenness centrality. Section III describes the proposed 
generalized contingency analysis (GCA) underlying our 
contribution in finding the most critical lines in the network. 
Section IV empirically evaluates the proposed approach. 
Section V concludes the paper. 
II.  CENTRALITY DEFINITION AND EXTENSION 
Centrality metrics are used in network science to rank the 
relative importance of vertices and edges in a graph. In 
network analysis, there are several metrics for the centrality of 
a vertex or an edge [8]. In this paper we use group 
betweenness centrality of the edges to find the most critical 
lines in power systems. We first review the definition of 
betweenness centrality and then extend it to the group 
betweenness centrality.  
A.  Betweenness Centrality 
Electric power grids can be modeled as graphs G:=(V,E), 
where V(vertices) and E(edges) are the sets of buses and lines. 
Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a vertex 
lies on paths between other vertices. Vertices with high 
betweenness may have considerable influence within a 
network since more paths that connect different vertices 
passthrough them. They are also the ones whose removal from 
the network will most likely disrupt information or power 
flows between other vertices because they lie on the largest 
number of paths connecting different vertices.  
 
Figure 1.  The equivalent graph of IEEE 118-bus test cases. The 
green nodes show the both ends of the line whose outage has the 
highest LODF factor. All the neighbors with three hop distance (i.e. 
search level equals to three) from the green nodes are shown by red 
colors. The lines with the blue end node s are the second and the third 
lines with the highest LODF values. These lines are used to 
implement the concept of the group betweenness centrality for the N-
3 contingency analysis. The set of red nodes will be investigated to 
determine the critical lines. 
 
The betweenness centrality concept can be extended from 
vertices to measure the influence of edges in a graph. 
Betweenness centrality is defined as the ratio of the number of 
shortest paths that passthrough an edge to the total number of 
shortest paths between all possible pairs of vertices. Figure 1 
visualizes the concepts of the betweenness centrality and its 
expansion, i.e. group betweenness centrality, to makes them 
more understandable. Mathematically, betweenness centrality 
of an edge can be expressed as:  
𝐵𝐶(𝑒) = ∑
𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡|𝑒)
𝜎(𝑠,𝑡){𝑠,𝑡∈𝑉}
                                      (1) 
where 𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡|𝑒) is the number of shortest paths in the graph 
between s and t that contain edge e, and 𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡) represents the 
number of shortest paths in the graph between s and t.  
The betweenness centrality concept measures the importance 
of a single node (edge) and thus can be applied to solve the N-
1contingency analysis. The underlying assumption for the 
proposed N-x contingency analysis is that cascading failures 
might occur from the simultaneous failure of a x critical lines. 
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Thus, the betweenness centrality concept needs to be adapted 
to measure the importance of multiple nodes (edges). In this 
connection, we proposed a new group betweenness centrality 
that is explained in sequel. 
B.  Group Betweenness Centrality 
The goal of the group betweenness centrality is to identify a 
set of the most important components that their lost has a 
severe impact on the network. However, betweenness 
centrality metric is for the individual component (a vertex or 
an edge). 
Thus, to perform the N-x contingency analysis we extend the 
betweenness centrality metric to consider a group of entities. 
Mathematically, group betweenness centrality of an edge can 
be expressed as: 
𝐺𝐵𝐶(𝐸𝐺
𝑖 ) = ∑
𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡|𝐸𝐺
𝑖
)
𝜎(𝑠,𝑡){𝑠,𝑡∈𝑉\ 𝐸𝐺
𝑖 }                            (2) 
where 𝐸𝐺
𝑖
 is a subset of edges of interest, 𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡) is the 
number of shortest paths between s and t, and 𝜎(𝑠, 𝑡|𝐸𝐺
𝑖 ) is 
the number of shortest paths between s and t that contain any 
element in 𝐸𝐺
𝑖
. The notion of group betweenness centrality 
first introduced in [19], [20] to identify groups of individuals 
who have collective influence in a social network. For 
implementing the group betweenness centrality in (2) we first 
need to determine groups of lines, with the same number of 
lines (i.e. x), that need to be evaluated. However, the number 
of groups that need to be evaluated increases exponentially 
with respect to the number of elements in the group, (𝑁
𝑥
), 
which makes the group betweenness centrality in (2) 
computationally intractable for the large test cases. To cope 
with this issue, we leverage the line outage distribution factor, 
explained in section III, to select limited numbers of groups 
out of the astronomical group of components that needs to be 
evaluated. Leveraging LODF to select group of lines that their 
loss has more impact on transmission power systems 
drastically reduces the number of groups that need to be 
evaluated which is elaborated in Section IV. 
III.  SOLUTIONMETHODOLOGY 
This section leverages the group betweenness centrality 
concept presented in Section II-B and the LODF metric to 
identify the most critical lines in the electric power grids. The 
pure graph theory information, i.e. group betweenness 
centrality, cannot fully address the characteristic of the electric 
power grid. Thus, it is essential to incorporate the LODF 
metric to take the electric power grid’s features into account. 
The next section reviews the LODF metric first and then 
presents the proposed algorithm that leverages LODF and 
Group Betweenness Centrality to select critical N-x 
contingencies. 
A.  Line outage distribution factors  
Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) are a sensitivity 
measure of how a change in a line’s status affects the flows on 
other lines in the system. LODFs are used extensively when 
modeling the linear impact of contingencies in PowerWorld 
Simulator [21]. LODF metrics in electric power grids provide 
approximate but quick solutions for the change in the line 
flow. The quick computation of the LODF metric makes it an 
attractive measure for solving different problems in power 
systems. The LODF metric is used to screen multiple element 
contingencies in [18]. The LODF is also used for detecting 
island formation in power networks [22]. The LODF used to 
solve the security constrained unit commitment problem 
[23]and for evaluating distribution network expansion options 
[24]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Normalized LODF for different order of contingency 
analysis (i.e. different x in the N-x term) for 200-bus test cases. The 
colors demonstrate the normalized LODF values. 
 
LODFs vary with change in the topology, when an outage 
occurs [25]. Multiple efforts have studied calculating LODFs 
dynamically, i.e. after occurring outages, as well as extending 
the LODF definition for multiple contingency analysis [25]-
[27]. Although the LODF metric changes after outages, these 
changes usually happen gradually as the number of outages 
increase. Therefore, it would be a reasonable assumption for 
the LODF metric to remain fixed for a few line outages. To 
validate this assumption, we investigate the LODF changes for 
different N-x contingency analysis for 200-bustest systems 
which are illustrate in Figure 2. The x- and y-axis show the 
line number and the contingency analysis order (i.e. x in the 
N-x term), respectively. The colors demonstrate the 
normalized LODF values (i.e. LODF values divided by 
maximum value of LODFs after each outage). Lines with very 
small LODFs are mitigated for illustration purposes. Figure 
2shows that the LODF would not change drastically after few 
line outages which validates our assumption. 
B.  Proposed Methodology  
We leverage the group betweenness centrality concept and the 
LODF metric to identify the most critical lines in contingency 
analysis. The group betweenness centrality has previously 
been proposed to find critical lines in a power system [13]. 
However, the procedure in [13] uses pure topological 
information to find critical lines but neglects the electrical 
characteristics. Moreover, the procedure utilized to identify 
the groups is complicated. These two shortcomings are 
addressed in this paper via incorporating the LODF metric into 
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our GBC methodology. To this end, we first find the LODF 
metric for all lines and then select the limited number of lines 
based on the measure in (3). To further capture the physics of 
power networks and prevent selecting lines that carry a small 
portion of power flow, the power flows in lines are 
incorporated in (3).The mean of the remaining lines LODFs 
seems to be an appropriate measure for determining the 
importance of the lost line in the system. However, the value 
of LODF can be either 
positive or negative, so the mean of the corresponding LODFs 
may not capture the importance due to the offset of positive 
and negative LODF values for different lines. Therefore, in 
this paper, we use the absolute value of LODFs to capture the 
line importance in power systems. Furthermore, losing a line 
might change the LODF values of a small set of the lines 
drastically while change the others slightly. We are looking 
fora line that its lost increases the LODF of all other lines not 
only a small set of them. To this end, the standard deviation of 
the absolute LODFs values is incorporated in the proposed 
metric for identifying the high impacted lines in the system. 
Mathematically, the proposed metric can be expressed as: 
 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹(𝑖) =
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑠))
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹𝑠))
                               (3) 
𝑀(𝑖) = 𝑃𝐹(𝑖) × min{𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹(𝑖) , 1}                    (4) 
Where NLODF and M are normalized LODF metric and 
the proposed measure for selecting critical lines, respectively. 
𝑃𝐹(𝑖) is the power flow in line i during the normal 
operation; 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(. ), 𝑠𝑡𝑑(. ), and 𝑎𝑏𝑠(. ) indicate the mean, the 
standard deviation, and the absolute functions, respectively. In 
this paper, we utilize PowerWorld Simulator [21] to calculate 
LODFs. However, if losing a line creates an islanding 
situation, the PowerWorld Simulator does not calculate the 
exact LODF but assign a large value to the remaining lines’ 
LODF which makes the 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹(𝑖)  value a very large 
number. Without islanding situation, the 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹(𝑖)  values 
varies between [0,1]. For handling the islanding situation, we 
enforce the 𝑁𝐿𝑂𝐷𝐹(𝑖) value corresponds to the islanding 
situation to be 1 as it is formulated in (3b). Equation (3b) 
represents the metric that is used to identify critical lines.  
A metric that leverages the physics of the power networks 
as well as their topological information can effectively 
identify the critical lines in power systems. To this end, we 
first evaluate equation (3b) for all the lines in the network and 
select the first 10% of the lines with the highest value. Then 
we search for the critical lines based on the search level i.e. a 
prespecified parameter that determine how deep the proposed 
algorithm should search around the selected lines.  
Figure 1 visualizes the searching mechanism of the pro-
posed approach for the IEEE 118-bus test case. We first select 
the lines with highest measure value of (3b). One of these 
lines is illustrated with green buses at its both ends. The next 
step is finding all the nodes in graph G that are within 
distanced, i.e. search level, from these green nodes. For 
brevity this set of buses are named “neighboring buses” in this 
paper. For the N-1contingency analysis, equation (1) is 
applied to the neighboring buses where s, t are different 
combination of buses in this set and e is the line that both ends 
are shown by the green buses. For the N-x contingency 
analysis we should first determine the 𝐸𝐺
𝑖
, the subset of edges 
of interest. In this connection, other lines with high value of 
(3b) in which their end buses are within the neighboring buses 
are selected for the N-x contingency analysis. It is notable that 
there are two parameters that we can control to find the critical 
lines in the proposed approach. The first parameter is x which 
determine the contingency analysis level. The second 
parameter is the “search level” that determines the number of 
neighboring buses that should be evaluated. The higher search 
level increases the search distance in the graph for the 
contingency analysis, i.e. more red buses in Figure 1, but it 
incurs more computational burden. The execution time for 
different search level is elaborated for different test cases in 
Section IV.  
 
In a cascading power transmission outage, component out-
ages might propagate nonlocally; after one component out-
ages, the next failure may be far, both topologically and 
geographically [28]. It is notable that the higher “search level” 
parameter enables the proposed approach to find critical lines 
that are far away from each other. However, higher “search 
level” incurs more computational complexity to the proposed 
approach especially when it applies on larger test cases. 
Another feature that enables the proposed approach to globally 
search for the critical lines is that it selects the first Y% of the 
lines (e.g. 10%) with higher measure value of (3b) and then 
starts searching around those lines. Those selected lines are 
usually distant, both topologically and geographically, that 
facilitates the proposed approach to find critical lines globally.  
The steps of the proposed approach for identify critical 
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lines are detailed in Algorithm 1 and 2. 
 
IV.  RESULTS ANDANALYSIS 
This section demonstrates the effectiveness of the pro-
posed approach using selected synthetic test cases from the 
benchmark library for electric power grids in Texas A&M 
University [29]. These test cases were selected since they 
mimic realistic electric power grids. Synthetic electric grid 
cases are a representation of fictitious power grids with a 
detailed modeling of the power system elements [30]. Our 
implementations use PowerWorld [21] for contingency 
analysis, Python as a programming language, and ESA [31], a 
Python package that provides an easy to use and light-weight 
wrapper for interfacing with PowerWorld’s Simulator 
Automation Server (SimAuto), as an interference to 
communicate with PowerWorld. The results are computed 
using a laptop with an i7 1.80 GHz processor and 16 GB of 
RAM. Three different test cases including 200-, 500-, and 
2000-bustest cases are investigated to authenticate the ability 
of the proposed approach in finding critical lines in electric 
power grids. The result for each test case is discussed in detail 
in sequel. 
▪ 200-Bus Test System  
The 200-bus test system is a synthetic test case with 
245branches and 49 generators that builds from public 
information and a statistical analysis of real power systems 
[29]. This test system is selected purposely since its relatively 
small size enables the exhaustive search in identifying the 
critical lines which can be used for authenticating the results 
obtained by the proposed approach. In this connection, a 
brute-force search is performed for finding the N-
1contingencies in the 200-bus test system to evaluate the 
performance of the proposed algorithm. It is notable that the 
200-bus test system is N-1resilient and as it was expected the 
brute-force search finds only one reserved limit violation, 
where there is not enough active power reserves in the make-
up power specification to cover the active power changes by 
the contingency. The application of the proposed approach 
finds the exact same violation for the N-1contingency 
analysis. This verifies the ability of the proposed approach in 
identifying contingencies in power systems. To further 
evaluate the ability of the proposed approach in finding the 
critical lines, another brute-force search is fulfilled for 
identifying N-2 contingencies in 200-bus test system and the 
obtained results match those obtained by the proposed 
algorithm. The brute-force search and the proposed approach 
found the N-2 contingencies for 200-bus test cases in 230 and 
38 seconds, respectively. Comparing the computational times 
of the brute force search and the proposed approach for 
finding N-2 contingencies reveals the ability of the proposed 
approach in finding critical lines in large test cases which 
cannot be done by the exhaustive search. The proposed 
approach is applied to identify critical lines for different 
contingency analysis in the 200-bus test system. The results 
are summarized in Table I. The first column lists the x in the 
N-x contingency term. The second and the third columns 
represent critical lines and contingency types, respectively and 
the fourth column represents number of contingencies.  
 
 
Figure 3. One-line diagram of the 200-bus test case and the 
corresponding overflow contingency caused by the removal of [136, 
133], [135, 133] lines. The bottom portion of Figure 3 shows the 
zoom-in view of the area that violation has occurred. 
 
With the contingency analysis tool in PowerWorld, we 
capture four types of “limit violations” in this paper, including 
reserve limit, overflow, undervoltage and unsolved. The 
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unsolved cases represent a situation where there is no solution 
for the power flow equations, or they cannot converge. The 
overflow and undervoltage violations can be counted by the 
number of components that fall into the category. The critical 
lines in the second column are those that their lost has severe 
impact on the network performance. These data are crucial for 
power system operation and planning. The One-line diagram 
of the 200-bus test cases and the corresponding violations 
caused by the outage of lines [189, 187], [187, 121] are 
illustrated in Figure 3. The bottom portion of this figure shows 
the zoom-in view of the area that violation has occurred.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Execution time comparison for various x in the N-x contingency 
analysis of 200-bus test system. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Execution time comparison for various “search level” in the 
N-x contingency analysis of 200-bus test system. 
The box-and-whisker plot shown in Figure 4 compares the 
impact of x on the execution times of N-x contingency 
analysis for 200-bus test case. Every box contains the 
execution time of various contingency analysis with different 
search levels (i.e. 1-8) and a specific x in the N-x term. The 
lower and upper ends of the boxes in Figure 5 reflect the first 
and third quartiles, and the lines inside the boxes denote the 
median. There is not a significant difference between the 
median lines of the boxes which reflects the fact that the 
proposed approach can solve higher order of N-x contingency 
analysis within a reasonable time. This result was expected 
because for a same search level a same set of neighboring 
buses are utilized in identifying different N-x contingency 
analysis. In other words, the execution time of different N-x 
contingency analysis for specific search level changes slightly 
for different x values. The plot in Figure 5 shows the impact of 
different search levels on the execution times of contingency 
analysis in 200-bus test system. The execution time linearly 
increases with the search level increment. The increase in the 
search level enables the proposed approach to search in a 
broader area but it incurs computational burden. 
 
Table I 
RESULTS FROM APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
TO 200-BUS TEST SYSTEM. 
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▪ 500-Bus Test System  
The 500-bus test system, with 597 branches and 90 
generators, is a relatively large synthetic test case that is used 
for evaluating the ability of the proposed approach in 
identifying critical lines. All the synthetic test cases used in 
this paper are N-1 resilient, i.e. no contingency occurs with the 
outage of a single line. Furthermore, these test cases are 
resilient enough that it is hard to identify a contingency by 
randomly removing multiple lines. However, the proposed 
algorithm can identify overflow violations which occur by the 
outage of three branches, i.e. [142, 141], [424, 423], [87, 141]. 
Finding contingencies caused by the outage of three lines 
reveals the ability of the proposed approach in identifying 
critical lines in relatively large resilient test cases such as the 
500-bus test system. The results of different contingency 
analysis for finding the most critical lines in the 500-bus test 
system are summarized in Table II. It is notable that multiple 
critical lines are identified for each N-x contingency analysis. 
The results in Table II summarize both contingency type and 
number of contingencies for the outage of critical lines in the 
500-bus test system.  
 
Table II 
RESULTS FROM APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
TO 500-BUS TEST SYSTEM. 
 
The execution time of the contingency analysis approaches 
plays an important role in power system operation and control. 
Many approaches for identifying critical lines are not tractable 
to be applied on large test cases. However, the proposed 
approach performs the N-3 contingency analysis in the 
relatively large 500-bus test case in just 5 minutes.  
 
 
Figure 6. (a) Execution time comparisons of various contingency 
analysis using GCA. (b) Execution time comparisons of different 
search levels in GCA for 500-bus test system. 
The One-line diagram of the 500-bus test cases and the 
corresponding violations caused by the outage of the lines 
[142, 141], [424,423], [87, 141] are illustrated in Figure 7. The 
bottom portion of this Figure 7 depicts the zoom-in view of 
the area that violation has happened ( i.e. the 112% overflow 
in the line).e plot in Figure 6 (a) compares the impact of x on 
the execution time of N-x contingency analysis for 500-bustest 
case. As it was expected the execution time of N-x 
contingency analysis for different x values does not change 
significantly for a same “search level”. Similarly, the plot in 
Figure 6 (b) shows the impact of different search levels on the 
execution time of N-x contingency analysis for 500-bus test 
system. Although the increment in search level increases the 
execution time of N-x contingency analysis but the proposed 
algorithm remains computationally tractable for higher search 
levels. 
 
Figure 7. One-line diagram of the 500-bus test cases and the 
corresponding violations caused by the removal of [142, 141],[87, 
141],[424, 423] lines. The bottom portion of Figure 7 shows the 
zoom-in view of the area that violation has occurred. 
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▪ 2000-Bus Test System  
 
The 2000-bus test system, with 3206 branches and 544 
generators, is a synthetic test case that is utilized for 
evaluating the ability of the proposed approach in identifying 
critical lines in large test systems. The size of this synthetic 
test system makes it a challenging test case for contingency 
analysis, because the number of combinatorial scenarios that 
need to be evaluated increases drastically by the size of the 
network. Thus, for this test case the exhaustive search 
approaches are not tractable even for the N-3 contingency 
analysis. Like other synthetic test cases investigated in this 
paper, the 2000-bus test case is N-1 resilient. Furthermore, this 
test system is resilient enough that finding a contingency even 
after multiple lines outage, e.g. randomly removing 7 lines (N-
7contingency), is not easy. Conversely, the proposed approach 
can easily find a N-4 contingency caused by the outages of 
four lines including [5262, 5260], [5263, 5260], [5317, 5260], 
[5358, 5179]. The impact of x and search level on the 
execution time of N-x contingency analysis for 2000-bus test 
case are shown in Figure 8 (a) and Figure 8 (b), respectively. 
For the same search level, execution time of N-x contingency 
analysis in Figure 8 (a) change linearly for different x values. 
This enables the proposed approach to evaluate higher orders 
of N-x contingency analysis in large test systems. The lower 
search level mirrors the lower number of lines that need to be 
investigated. Thus, for different search levels in Figure 8 (b), 
the lower search level value yields the faster N-x contingency 
analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. (a) Execution time comparisons of various contingency 
analysis using GCA. (b) Execution time comparisons of different 
search levels in GCA for 2000-bus test system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III 
RESULTS FROM APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
TO 2000-BUS TEST SYSTEM. 
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Figure 9. One-line diagram of the 2000-bus test cases and the 
corresponding overflow contingency caused by the removal of [5262, 
5260],[5263, 5260],[5317, 5260],[5358, 5179] lines. The bottom 
portion of Figure 9 shows the zoom-in view of the area that violation 
has occurred. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The proposed approach exploits the physical and 
topological characteristics of the electric power grids for 
identifying the critical lines in N-x contingency analysis. 
Actually, augmenting the LODF metric, that represent the 
physics of the electric grid, with the group betweenness 
centrality metric, that represent the topology of the electric 
grid, enables the proposed approach to effectively finds the 
critical lines even in large test cases. Protecting the resulting 
elements can enable power grid operators to prevent cascading 
failures and operate the system more reliably. The curse of 
dimensionality inherent to the generalized contingency 
analysis (i.e. N-x contingency analysis with 𝑥 ≥ 2) makes this 
problem computationally infeasible, for even midsize electric 
grid, to be solved by the traditional approaches. The proposed 
approach decouples the computation with the problem size 
which enables that to perform the N-x contingency analysis 
with 𝑥 ≥ 2 in a reasonable time irrespective of the grid size. 
Results show that the proposed approach acts as a 
straightforward and computationally tractable search engine 
that can quickly identify critical lines even in large test cases. 
Unfortunately, the computational infeasibility of traditional 
methods of contingency analysis makes the validation of the 
proposed approach challenging. In this connection, using 
multiple synthetic testcases and different contingency analysis, 
we demonstrated that our approach computes the realistic 
solutions and holds a promise for larger test cases. Our 
ongoing work aims to improve our approach by making it as 
independent as possible from “search level”. In other words, 
we are working on an approach that can search in different 
part of electric power grids at the same time. Other ongoing 
work is developing further improvements to the proposed 
approach by updating the LODF metric after each line outage. 
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